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Heterogeneous Treatment and Self-Selection in a 
Wage Subsidy Experiment 
 
The Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) is a research and demonstration project that offered a 
generous time-limited income supplement to randomly selected welfare applicants under two 
conditions. The first, the eligibility condition, required that they remain on welfare for at least 
twelve months. The second, the qualification condition, required that they find a full-time job 
within twelve months after establishing eligibility. In this paper we focus on a neglected and 
important feature of the program, namely that the financial reward for becoming qualified is 
inversely related to the expected wage rate. Under very simple assumptions we show that 
those who have a low expected wage rate have a clear incentive to establish eligibility. 
Empirical non-parametric evidence strongly suggests that individuals self-select into 
eligibility. We jointly estimate a participation equation and a wage equation that are correlated 
through individual random effects. Our results show that the omission of self-selectivity into 
qualification translates into slightly overestimated treatment effects. 
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 1 Introduction
The Self-Suﬃciency Project (SSP) includes various demonstrations that were conducted in
Canada to measure the sensitivity of behavioural adjustments to various income support
schemes. One of the demonstrations, the Applicant Demonstration Project, oﬀered a generous
three-year income supplement to randomly selected welfare applicants under two important
conditions. The ﬁrst required that they remained on welfare for at least twelve months to
become eligible for the supplement. The second required that they ﬁnd a full-time job and
left the rolls within twelve months after establishing eligibility. Applicants randomly assigned
to the control group were entitled to the regular IA program. One of the objectives of the
Applicant demonstration was to measure the so-called “delayed exit” eﬀect, that is the extent
to which welfare applicants might delay their exit from IA in order to establish eligibility.
The SSP demonstrations have received widespread attention partly because of the gen-
erosity of the supplement it oﬀered and partly because of the large behavioral responses it
generated. For example, Ford, Gyarmati, Foley, Tattrie and Jimenez (2003) have found that
the greatest impacts of receiving the supplement occurred in the third year of the program
when the proportion of IA recipients was 10.3 percentage points lower for the treatment group
relative to the control group. Conversely, full-time work participation rates were 11.7 per-
centage points higher for the treatment group compared to the control group. Moreover, the
average cumulative supplement earned by treatments was about 19,500$. In addition, receipt
of the supplement appears to have had some long term positive eﬀects on work. Six years after
the beginning of the experiment, full-time work participation rates were still 4.9 percentage
points higher for the treatment group relative to the control group. Finally, although a number
of studies have found evidence of delayed exit behavior, all agree that the eﬀect is small (Card
and Robins (2005), Berlin, Bancroft, Card, Lin and Robins (1998), Lacroix and Kamionka
(2003)).
Most of the above results were derived from simple non-parametric comparisons between
treatment and control groups. They do not account for the complex incentives individu-
als in the treatment group face. Random assignment at baseline guarantees homogeneity
between control and treatment groups in terms of observable and unobservable characteris-
tics, but it does not prevent self-selection into the various phases of the experiment or across
employment/non-employment. These problems have been acknowledged for some time (e.g.
Dubin and Rivers (1993) and Ham and Lalonde (1996) in diﬀerent contexts). In a recent paper,
Card and Hyslop (2005) use a dynamic discrete choice model of IA participation to separate
total SSP eﬀect into three diﬀerent eﬀects: (1) an incentive to remain on IA to gain eligibility;
(2) an incentive to work in the qualiﬁcation phase; (3) an incentive to choose work over IA in
the SSP phase in order to receive the supplement. Their results show strong responses to all
three incentives. They found that about two-thirds of the total SSP eﬀect was due to short-
1term incentives (qualiﬁcation eﬀect).1 It is thus very likely that the subset of applicants who
establish eligibility may be a self-selected group. Likewise, conditional on establishing eligibil-
ity, those who manage to qualify for the supplement may constitute yet another self-selected
group.2
In this paper we focus on one important and neglected feature of the SSP program, namely
that the ﬁnancial reward for establishing qualiﬁcation is inversely related to the expected wage
rate. Thus, contrary to the aforementioned papers, we acknowledge the fact that the “treat-
ment” is not homogeneous but is a continuum that depends on observable (human capital)
and unobservable (heterogeneity) characteristics. In the most extreme case, an individual in
the treatment group may deem the income supplement as non-existent because of her high ex-
pected wage rate. Under very simple assumptions about the wage oﬀer distribution, we show
that those who establish eligibility are probably a self-selected group with lower than average
wage rates. Under these assumptions, we show that the impact of the ﬁnancial reward on
employment are likely overestimated. We provide non-parametric evidence to the eﬀect that
individuals in the treatment group self-select into diﬀerent statuses. Those who do not estab-
lish eligibility (i.e. exit IA within twelve months after random assignment) earn the highest
average wage rate. Irrespective of their qualiﬁcation status, those who establish eligibility earn
the lowest wage rates.
We investigate the impact of the SSP supplement using a gradual approach. First, we model
the transitions between IA and employment using a simple random eﬀects probit model. The
treatment and control groups are distinguished by a series of time-varying dummy variables.
Because the eligibility and qualiﬁcation statuses are not modelled explicitly, the parameter
estimates are similar to the so-called average treatment eﬀects. In order to investigate the
potential consequences of self-selection on the treatment eﬀects, we next estimate a similar
probit model but explicitly model the eligibility and qualiﬁcation statuses. The parameter
estimates are similar to the so-called average treatment on the treated eﬀects. This model is
contrasted with a speciﬁcation that jointly estimates the transition model and the accepted
wage rates. Both equations are correlated through their random eﬀects and contemporaneous
error terms. In the absence of self-selection into the eligibility and qualiﬁcation statuses, both
models should yield the same results. It turns out that accounting for the potential correlation
between the wage regression and the transition model decreases slightly the estimated impact
of the SSP treatment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy presents the SSP Applicant Demon-
stration and proposes a simple structural model with the necessary assumptions to give rise to
self-selection into eligibility. Section 3 provides simple descriptive statistics and non-parametric
1Based on the Recipient Demonstration, Zabel, Schwartz and Donald (2004) have found similar results,
although receipt of the income supplement was found to have had a negative impact on the probability of
exiting unemployment once entitlement ended.
2In a recent paper which focuses on the Recipient demonstration, Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes (2006) provide
empirical evidence that high-earning treatments may be willing to accept lower-paying jobs in order to qualify
for the supplement.
2evidence on potential selectivity problems. In Section 4 we propose an econometric model that
attempts to circumvent the selection issues, and whose results are presented in Section 5.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 The Self-Suﬃciency Program
One of the objectives of the SSP Applicant demonstration was to measure the delayed exit eﬀect
associated with being oﬀered a generous wage subsidy conditional on remaining on the welfare
rolls for a minimum of 13 months (eligibility condition). It randomly sampled single parents
who had applied for and received income assistance between February 1994 and February 1995
in British Columbia.3 The program oﬀered a generous, time-limited, monthly cash payment
to all those who found full-time job and left welfare within twelve months after meeting the
eligibility requirement.
Figure 1 illustrates the four phases of the SSP program. The 13-month eligibility phase is
the time treatments must remain on the IA rolls to be eligible for potential SSP payments (T1 =
13). Failure to remain at least 13 months on the rolls automatically entails disqualiﬁcation.4
The qualiﬁcation phase lasts a maximum of 12 months (T2 ≤ 25). During that period, eligible
treatments must ﬁnd a full-time job (minimum 30 hours/week) and leave the rolls. Failure to
ﬁnd a job disqualiﬁes them for SSP beneﬁts. The entitlement phase starts immediately upon
qualiﬁcation (at month 25 at the latest) and lasts 36 months (T3 ≤ 61). During that period,
qualiﬁed treatment earn a monthly subsidy if employed and are allowed to switch back and
forth between employment and IA without losing qualiﬁcation.
Figure 1: Time line for the SSP phases
Over the course of the entitlement (SSP) phase, the subsidy is paid out each month based on
the estimated annual earnings. The subsidy is equivalent to s(w,h) = 50% × (37,500$ − wh),
where w is the hourly wage rate and h is the annual hours of work. The subsidy can be
3To be considered as new entrants, applicants had not to have received IA in the six previous months. A
signiﬁcant minority (31%) had nevertheless received IA at some time in the two years prior to their current
application (Berlin et al. (1998)).
4In fact, welfare recipients had to be on the rolls 12 out of the ﬁrst 13 months after randomization. In this
paper, we deﬁne eligibility has being on welfare for 13 out of the ﬁrst 13 months after random assignment.
3relatively large.5 For example, an individual working 35 hours a week at 7$ per hour would
have a gross earning of 12,740$ per year without SSP and 25,183$ with SSP.6 It must be noted
that the distribution of the supplement is highly skewed. Qualiﬁed treatments in the upper
quartile of the distribution received on average 32,394$ over the SSP phase, while those in the
lower quartile only received 6,145$ (Ford et al. (2003)).
As depicted above, the Applicant study features three diﬀerent phases: Eligibility, Qualiﬁ-
cation, and Entitlement. The manner in which the phases are structured gives rise to complex
incentives. To gain better understanding, a number of authors have turned to standard search
models ` a la Mortensen (1977) to investigate potential individual responses (See, e.g., Card
and Hyslop(2005, 2006) and Bowlus et al. (2006)). In what follows, we brieﬂy sketch a simple
search model and underline how potential self-selection into the eligibility phase may arise.
2.1 The problem of the control group
Start ﬁrst with individuals in the control group. Assume they are risk-neutral and have to
choose between employment (E) and income assistance (IA), which, for simplicity, are assumed
to be mutually exclusive states. Workers and welfare recipients receive job oﬀers at a constant
rate, λ, that are characterized by a wage oﬀer, ω, drawn from a stationary distribution, F(ω),
with ω ∈ [ω,ω]. The net payoﬀ is equal to ω − c, where c represents ﬁxed costs to work.
Income assistance provides a monthly beneﬁt equal to b. Individuals are assumed to maximize
expected future income using a monthly discount rate, r. The utility derived from the job
oﬀer is compared to the utility derived from welfare. In addition, workers face an exogenous
probability of losing their job, δ (job destruction rate).
Individuals are assumed to follow a reservation-wage strategy. They will reject any wage
oﬀer below their reservation wage. Workers will refuse any oﬀer worth less than their current
wage. To see this, let ωr be the reservation wage. The expected steady-state inter-temporal
utility of IA is given by:
(1 + r)V IA = b + λ
Z ω
ωr
V E(ω)dF(ω) + [1 − λ(1 − F(ωr))]V IA,
where V E(ω) is the value of a job paying ω. The last term on the right-hand side is the value of
IA assuming no satisfactory job oﬀer was received. The value function of employed individuals
is equal to:
(1 + r)V E(ω) = (ω − c) + λ
Z ω
ω
V E(˜ ω)dF(˜ ω) + δV IA + [1 − δ − λ(1 − F(ω))]V E(ω).
5The benchmark earnings was adjusted to account for increases in the cost of living and was set at 37,625$
in 1996.
6Some might argue that the subsidy was in fact too generous. This claim is in part corroborated by Bowlus,
Lochner, Robinson and Zhong (2006) who estimate a structural search model with human capital. Their
simulations show that lowering the benchmark earnings from 37,500$ to 24,000$ would have yielded the same
results.
4The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the net income from a job paying ω. The second term
is the marginal beneﬁt accruing from a job oﬀer that exceeds the current wage. The third
term corresponds to the expected value of IA due to a job loss. Finally the last expression
corresponds to the value of remaining on the same job because no satisfactory oﬀer was received.
The reservation wage is such that V E(ωr) = V IA. By substitution, it thus follows that
ωr = b + c. In other words, an individual will always refuse a job oﬀer that does not entirely
compensate IA beneﬁts, b, and ﬁxed costs, c. This results is fairly common and follows from
the fact that the environment in which the individual must make decisions is in steady-state.
2.2 The problem of the treatment group
Contrary to the control group, the treatment group faces a non-stationary environment as
illustrated in Figure 1. Consequently, decisions are contingent upon time and must be analyzed
separately for each SSP-phase.
• Phase 1: Eligibility
Phase 1 lasts T1 = 13 months. Over the course of the phase individuals must compare
the value of IA conditional on not having left IA once and becoming potentially qualiﬁed
in Phase 2 with that of taking a job and losing eligibility. Let V
IA,1
t denote the value of






















1 if t = T1 − 1,
where ω
r,1
t is the reservation wage at month t of Phase 1, and where V
IA,2
1 is the value
of IA in the ﬁrst month of Phase 2. Each month t ≤ T1 − 1 the individual must decide
whether she will accept a job starting at the beginning of next month. Acceptance is
akin to refusing future SSP beneﬁts and facing the control group’s problem. The value
of the job must be compared to the value of remaining an additional month on IA and
increasing the likelihood of establishing eligibility.
At month T1 those who ﬁnd employment starting at month T1 + 1 are automatically
entitled to the SSP beneﬁt. Thus at month T1 − 1 the appropriate continuation value is
V
IA,2
1 , the value of IA at the beginning of Phase 2, conditional on not yet being qualiﬁed.







t+1 if t ≤ T1 − 2
V
IA,2
1 if t = T1 − 1
• Phase 2: Qualiﬁcation
Having established eligibility, individuals must ﬁnd a full-time job within 12 months in


















t V E(ω)dF(ω) + [1 − λ(1 − F(ω
r,2
t ))]V IA if t = T2.
Here WE(ω,1) is the value function of employed individuals receiving a wage ω with one
month of elapsed beneﬁts. Thus each month t ≤ T2 −1 the individual must compare the
value of a job worth WE(ω,1) with the value of postponing employment an additional
month (V
IA,2
t+1 ). Past the qualiﬁcation period, i.e. at t = T2, the individual faces the
control group’s problem and the environment becomes stationary (hence the omission of
time indicators on the value function V IA).
The reservation wage in Phase 2 is implicitly given by:
WE(ω
r,2
t ,1) = V
IA,2
t+1 if 1 ≤ t ≤ T2 − 1
• Phase 3: Entitlement
Treatments who have qualiﬁed for the supplement are entitled to T3 = 36 months of


















t V E(ω)dF(ω) + [1 − λ(1 − F(ωr))]V IA if t = T3
At t = T3, the entitlement period ends and the treatment now faces the same problem a
control does. The reservation wage in Phase 3 is implicitly given by:
WE(ω
r,3
t ,t + 1) = V
IA,3
t+1 if 2 ≤ t ≤ T3 − 1
The reservation wage proﬁle can be easily derived from the above value functions. Note ﬁrst
that WE(ω,1) > V E(ω), i.e. a Phase 2 job with SSP beneﬁts is worth more than a job that
does not carry a bonus. It thus follows that V
IA,2




t . Hence the




t+1. It can also be
shown that ω
r,1
T1 > ωr due to the fact that V
IA,2
1 > V IA. Thus the reservation wage increases
as one nears T1 and is necessarily higher than that of the control group at T1. Treatments are
thus expected to have lower exit rates in Phase 1 (delayed exit eﬀects).
The same type of reasoning applies to Phase 2. Indeed, because WE(ω,1) > V E(ω), it
follows that V
IA,2




t . In other words, access to potential beneﬁts
increases the value of IA at the beginning of Phase 2. It declines regularly as one nears T2 due





t+1, i.e. the reservation wage declines with t. In Phase 3 it can also be shown
that the reservation wage is constant throughout. In addition, because V IA
T3 = V IA it follows
that ω
r,3
T3 = ωr. Finally, because WE(ω,T3) > V E(ω) it must be the case that prior to T3,
ω
r,3
T3−t < ωr. Treatments are thus expected to have higher transition rates into employment.
62.3 Selection into eligibility
The analysis so far has assumed that individuals receive wage oﬀers that are drawn from a single
distribution. As stressed by Stern and Canals-Cerda (2002), unobserved characteristics are
important in explaining the behavior of workers in the labor market. For example, workers with
identical observed characteristics may face diﬀerent wage oﬀer distributions and have diﬀerent
reservation wages due to diﬀerences in relevant unobserved characteristics. Unfortunately, very
few analyzes have considered unobserved heterogeneity within the context of a search model.
This is particularly important in the context of the SSP program since the incentive eﬀects are
directly proportional to the wage rate a worker is likely to receive.
Recently, a number of authors have introduced heterogeneity both on the supply side
(workers) and the demand side (ﬁrms) of equilibrium search models (see Bontemps, Robin
and den Berg (1999), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)). Others, e.g. Bloemem (1997), have
introduced preference heterogeneity within a partial-equilibrium model. To illustrate how
potential selection problems into eligibility may arise, we now assume that the wage oﬀer
distribution depends on some unobserved heterogeneity component, ε, that is drawn from a
distribution with mean 0 and ﬁnite variance. We may consider ε as a productivity factor that
is unobserved by the analyst but known to the individual (and valued by the market). For
convenience, we may write the conditional wage distribution as F(ε | η).
To ﬁx ideas, we assume as in Bowlus et al. (2006) that workers have diﬀerent (unobservable)
skills and receive a wage equal to ˜ ω = ω + ε.7 The unobservable component, ε, is assumed
continuously distributed over [ε,ε]. The above discussion has made clear that the diﬀerences
between the control and the treatment groups’ reservation wage proﬁles hinge on the value of
the SSP beneﬁts in Phase 3. The value of a Phase 3 job may be written as follows:
(1 + r)WE(˜ ω,t) = (ω + ε − c) +








t+1 + [1 − δ − λ(1 − F(˜ ω))]WE(˜ ω,t + 1).
Obviously, individuals with large values of ε will receive a large wage oﬀer soon after random-
ization. Consequently they will expect relatively low SSP beneﬁts. For them the incentive to
postpone exit from welfare in Phase 1 is much smaller. In fact, there might exist a critical
value, ε∗, such that WE(ε∗,1) = V E(ω). Individuals in the treatment group with ε ≥ ε∗ thus
behave no diﬀerently from those in the control group. In addition, because they typically com-
mand a greater than average wage rate, they can be expected to leave IA at a higher rate than
controls. Likewise, one may also argue that the entitlement eﬀect in Phase 3 will be larger
the smaller the (expected) wage oﬀer. Indeed, individuals who expect low wage oﬀers beneﬁt
on average from a relatively large subsidy. The converse naturally holds for those who receive
high wage oﬀers. It is thus diﬃcult to distinguish the entitlement eﬀect from the unobserved
7Alternatively, we could assume as suggested by Stern and Canals-Cerda (2002) that individuals face diﬀerent
wage oﬀer distributions. We could write F(ω;mi,τi) where mi is the location parameter of group or individual
i, and τi is the dispersion parameter.
7heterogeneity component in Phase 3. The problem may even be compounded if we allowed for
unobserved preference heterogeneity as in Bloemem (1997) and Wolpin and Eckstein (1989).
The above discussion underlines the potential for selectivity into eligibility due to the built-
in SSP incentives. Hence, the treatment group can be divided into three subgroups: those who
do not establish eligibility, those who establish eligibility but do not manage to qualify and
those who qualify, conditional on establishing eligibility. The main issue from a statistical
point of view is to determine the distribution of ε among the diﬀerent subgroups. To the
extent the distribution is the same across the subgroups, a simple comparison between those
who qualify and the control group would provide an unbiased estimator of the treatment eﬀect
on the treated. The above discussion suggest this is rather unlikely. In the next section we
provide prima facie evidence on potential self-selectivity into eligibility.
3 Data
The data we use in this paper are taken from the SSP Applicant Study. Selected individuals
who agreed to be part of the experiment were interviewed at home to complete a baseline
survey. They were asked to sign an informed consent document that explained the nature of the
experiment, described the random assignment process, and stated that all individual-level data
would be kept conﬁdential. They also had to agree to have their administrative social assistance
record linked to the survey data. Immediately after the baseline interview, individuals were
randomly assigned to either the treatment or the control group. The experimental sample
comprises 1,648 treatments and 1,667 controls. Treatments were sent a letter and a brochure
explaining their potential eligibility for an earnings supplement. They were reminded they had
to remain on welfare for at least 12 months to be eligible for the supplement, and that upon
establishing eligibility, they had to ﬁnd a full-time job within the next 12 months to qualify
for the income supplement.8
Four follow-up surveys were conducted 12, 30, 48 and 72 months after the baseline interview
to keep track of changes in educational attainment, work-related training, employment, work
experience, marital status, number of children, etc. Information on IA beneﬁts per se was
obtained from administrative records. Due to sample attrition, of the 3,315 original respondents
in the baseline interview, only 2,015 completed all succeeding follow-up interviews. The analysis
in this paper is based on this balanced panel.9
8Although SSP rules stated that qualiﬁcation had to occur between months 13 and 24 after random assign-
ment, these were interpreted rather loosely. In the data, individuals have qualiﬁed as early as month 11 and as
late as month 27.
9We also imposed a few additional restrictions. For instance one applicant reported a negative age and 47
did not report years of experience properly. Upon deleting these 48 observations we are left with a sample of
1,967 applicants who are each observed for 71 consecutive months.
83.1 Sample statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample at baseline. The ﬁrst and second columns
concern the control group and the treatment group as a whole. In columns (3)–(5) the treat-
ment group is broken down into those who are unqualiﬁed, ineligible and qualiﬁed. Unqualiﬁed
applicants have established eligibility but did not ﬁnd a job in the qualiﬁcation phase, while
ineligible applicants left IA within 13 months and have not established eligibility.10 Qualiﬁed
applicants have established eligibility and did ﬁnd a job during the qualiﬁcation phase. Despite
having removed nearly 40% of the original sample, columns (1) and (2) show that control and
treatment groups are nearly identical.11 Thus attrition is unlikely to aﬀect a particular group
of applicants.12 The ﬁgures show that the mean age is about 33, that women represent about
93% of all applicants, that approximately 71% were born in Canada, and that very few had a
spouse at baseline. Individuals in the sample are relatively well educated. Indeed, over 68%
of them had either attended a community college or a university. Finally, roughly 41% own a
car but very few own a house.13
Interestingly, columns (3)–(5) shows important diﬀerences. Among the unqualiﬁed group
fewer are married, own a car or a house, and more are foreign born. Most importantly, the
overall level of schooling and the number of years of work experience are by far the lowest among
the treatment subgroups. Those in the ineligible group are slightly older, proportionately more
own a car or a house and have fewer preschoolers. They are by far the best educated group
among the treatment subgroups (74% have some post-secondary schooling) and have the most
years of experience at baseline. Finally, the overall characteristics of those who qualiﬁed are
somewhat located between those of the two previous groups. They are better educated and
have more years of experience than the unqualiﬁed group but not so much as those in the
ineligible group.
Table 2 is similar to Table 1 except that it focuses on labor market outcomes. The means
are computed over the 72-month period of observation so that diﬀerences between the controls
and treatments reﬂect behavioral adjustments. Interestingly, the mean hourly wage rates of
the two groups are nearly identical. Yet, there is substantial variation within the treatment
group. Indeed, the ineligible treatments earn an average wage rate that is 8.9% higher than
the controls and as much as 26.5% higher than the qualiﬁed treatments. Assuming full-time
employment (2000 hours), a qualiﬁed treatment could expect an income supplement of 10,100$.
An ineligible treatment, had she qualiﬁed, could only expect 7,810$ on average. The diﬀerences
in wage rates do not translate into large diﬀerences in (conditional) hours of work, as controls
only work slightly more hours per month than the treatments and very little variation is
10Recall that we deﬁne eligibility as remaining on IA for the ﬁrst 13 months after random assignment.
11Although not reported, we tested that the means of each variable in Table 1 was identical for the two groups.
The null assumption was never rejected.
12See Hansen (2006) for a detailed analysis of the sample attrition in the SSP Applicant study.
13According to the provincial welfare program, the net value of houses and cars are assumed to generate a
monthly income ﬂow that contributes to the household’s income. Assets are thus implicitly means-tested.
9Table 1: Sample statistics: Mean individual characteristics at baseline
(Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Control group Treatment group
All Unqualiﬁed Ineligible Qualiﬁed
Sample size 970 997 253 445 299
Gender (woman = 1) 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.92
(0.25) (0.27) (0.24) (0.28) (0.27)
Age (years) 33.23 33.41 33.30 33.99 32.63
(7.20) (7.80) (7.35) (8.25) (7.40)
Married (married = 1) 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.05
(0.23) (0.25) (0.19) (0.29) (0.23)
Born (Canada = 1) 0.72 0.70 0.60 0.75 0.73
(0.45) (0.46) (0.49) (0.43) (0.45)
Car (owner = 1) 0.40 0.42 0.28 0.53 0.39
(0.49) (0.49) (0.45) (0.50) (0.49)
Home (owner = 1) 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.18 0.11
(0.35) (0.34) (0.30) (0.38) (0.31)
Children under 7 0.89 0.86 0.99 0.73 0.94
(0.83) (0.81) (0.82) (0.76) (0.84)
Children under 19 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.94 0.88
(0.99) (0.97) (0.93) (0.98) (0.99)
Work experience (years) 10.99 11.25 9.30 12.56 10.93
(7.02) (7.44) (6.87) (7.85) (6.85)
Schooling (proportion)
No high school 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.14 0.17
(0.39) (0.39) (0.45) (0.35) (0.37)
High school 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.14
(0.33) (0.35) (0.37) (0.33) (0.35)
Collegial 0.52 0.53 0.44 0.55 0.56
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
University 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.13
(0.37) (0.36) (0.30) (0.39) (0.33)
1. When comparing unqualiﬁed and ineligible applicants, diﬀerences in means are statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05
level for Work experience, Children under 7, Born, Car, Home and Schooling and at 0.10 level for Married.
2. When comparing unqualiﬁed and qualiﬁed applicants, diﬀerences in means are statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05
level for Work experience, Born, Car and Schooling.
3. When comparing ineligible and unqualiﬁed applicants, diﬀerences in means are statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05
level for Age, Work experience, Children under 7, Car and Home and Schooling and at 0.10 level for Married
and Schooling.
observed among the treatment subgroups. Consequently, the variations in monthly earnings
arise principally because of variations in the wage rates.
3.2 Wage, earnings and hours of work distributions
The ﬁgures reported in Table 2 provide some crude evidence that the establishment of eligibility
may be related to expected wage rates. To investigate the matter further, Figure 2 plots
the ratio of hourly wage rates of controls, ineligible treatments and unqualiﬁed treatments
10Table 2: Sample statistics: Mean labor market outcomes†
(Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Control group Treatment groups
All Unqualiﬁed
‡ Ineligible Qualiﬁed
Hourly wage 10.05 9.71 9.42 10.94 8.65
(4.25) (4.03) (5.06) (4.41) (2.79)
Log-wage 2.21 2.19 2.13 2.30 2.11
(0.42) (0.38) (0.43) (0.43) (0.27)
Monthly hours 138.42 133.30 132.12 133.71 133.30
(38.50) (34.78) (36.01) (36.16) (33.01)
Monthly 1366.22 1278.13 1177.14 1444.58 1153.96
earnings (674.99) (592.67) (554.45) (672.83) (474.68)
Monthly 7.07 7.01 6.93 7.12 6.94
log-earnings (0.47) (0.45) (0.44) (0.50) (0.50)
Monthly SSP 700.56
beneﬁts (215.37)
†Means over computed over 72 months and exclude zero values for applicants which hourly wage,
hours and earnings are all three observed. Hereinafter, wage rates and earnings are expressed
in 1993 constant dollars.
‡Few unqualiﬁed applicants work over the 72 months period of observation. Hence, we have to
be careful with the interpretation of these means.
over those of the qualiﬁed treatments. The ratios are computed monthly and are reported
as of month 15 after random assignment.14 There are a number of noteworthy features in
the ﬁgure. First, ineligible treatments and controls earn an average hourly wage rate that
is approximately 5%-10% higher than that of qualiﬁed treatments. Second, unqualiﬁed and
qualiﬁed treatments earn approximately the same average wage rate, although the relation is
relatively noisy. Third, the ratios are relatively stable up to month 48. In the ensuing months
the three subgroups experience a decline in their hourly wage rates relative to those of the
qualiﬁed treatments. Month 48 coincides more or less to the ﬁrst month at which those who
qualiﬁed the earliest (around month 13) lose their SSP beneﬁts. This could indicate that,
conditional on remaining employed, the loss of beneﬁts by the qualiﬁed treatment is partly
compensated for by an increased wage rate. Finally, by the end of month 72, the controls and
the qualiﬁed treatments earn the same hourly wage rate. The ineligible group on the other
hand still earns approximately 6% more than the qualiﬁed treatments.
Figure 3 depicts the kernel-smoothed probability density functions of log-wages for the
control group and the three treatment subgroups. The wage rates are computed as the mean
of all reported individual wages over the course of the experiment. The main notable feature
of this ﬁgure is that the density functions of the qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed treatments are the
most heavily skewed to the left, while the density function of ineligible applicants has a very
heavy tail to the right. The ﬁgure also shows that the density function of the controls more
or less corresponds to a combination of the other three curves, as should be expected. This is
14Too few unqualiﬁed and qualiﬁed treatments work in the eligibility phase to allow valid statistical compar-
isons. Likewise, relatively few unqualiﬁed treatments work prior to month 25.
11Figure 2: Monthly mean-wage ratios
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consistent with Table 2 which showed that the average wage rates of the control and treatment
groups are nearly identical. Figure 3 highlights the fact that there is considerable heterogeneity
among the treatment subgroups. It also suggests that those who end-up receiving SSP beneﬁts
are precisely those who beneﬁt the most from the program.
Figure 3: Kernel-smoothed densities of log-wages













Figure 4 plots the density functions of the average non-zero monthly hours of work. The
hours distribution of qualiﬁed treatments has more mass to the left of 120 hours, as required
by the program. Unqualiﬁed treatments, on the other hand, have a ﬂatter distribution with
12considerable mass located to the left of 120 hours, suggesting that many held part-time jobs.
Finally, ineligible treatments and controls have nearly identical distributions.
Figure 4: Kernel-smoothed densities of monthly hours of work














Lastly, Figure 5 plots the probability density functions of average non-zero monthly log-
earnings. Earnings are computed as the product of monthly hours of work and hourly wage
rates. The ﬁgure thus summarizes the two previous ones. It unambiguously shows that qualiﬁed
treatments earn less than both the controls and the ineligible treatments, while the latter earn
slightly more than the controls.
Figure 5: Kernel-smoothed densities of log-earnings











13The preceding ﬁgures suggest that the SSP’s built-in incentives may have resulted in sorting
the treatments into various subgroups with diﬀerent observable and presumably unobservable
characteristics. While suggestive the ﬁgures provide no formal evidence that the diﬀerences
they underline are statistically signiﬁcant. Table 3 reports a series of tests of equality between
the probability density functions depicted in the previous ﬁgures. The test statistics are based
on recent work by Li (1996).
Table 3: Equality of Distributions: Li’s Statistics†
(Bandwidth in parentheses)
Log-wages Hours Log earnings
Months Months Months Months Months
1–72 1–72 61–72 1–72 61–72
Qualiﬁed vs control 5.559 0.918 0.576 6.176 2.226
(0.096)⋆ (7.363) (9.490) (0.127)⋆ (0.153)⋆
Qualiﬁed vs ineligible 13.123 0.258 -0.068 12.523 3.985
(0.096)⋆ (7.363) (10.387) (0.127)⋆ (0.175)⋆
Qualiﬁed vs unqualiﬁed 1.654 2.155 0.570 3.283 0.877
(0.096)⋆⋆ (7.363)⋆ (11.324) (0.127)⋆ (0.175)
Control vs unqualiﬁed 2.774 1.640 -0.775 2.724 0.597
(0.097)⋆ (8.495) (9.490) (0.136)⋆ (0.153)
Control vs ineligible 1.714 -0.767 0.214 1.422 1.854
(0.097)⋆⋆ (8.495) (9.490) (0.136) (0.153)⋆⋆
Unqualiﬁed vs ineligible 4.222 1.547 0.182 5.077 3.947
(0.117)⋆ (9.520) (10.387) (0.179)⋆ (0.186)⋆
†The test compares H0 : ˆ f(xf) = ˆ g(xg) to H1 : ˆ f(xf)  = ˆ g(xg). The test statistic is ∼ N(0, 1).
Probability density functions are statistically diﬀerent at 0.05 level (⋆) and at 0.10 level (⋆⋆).
The ﬁrst column of the table reports test results for various combinations of log-wage
densities over the 72-month window. According to the table, all the distributions are distinct.
Column (2) compares monthly hours of work over the same 72-months window while column (3)
focuses on the year that followed the last month of SSP receipt (months 61 to 72). Interestingly,
column (2) shows that the null assumption that the distributions are identical is only rejected
when comparing qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed treatments. Likewise, Column (3) concludes that
the hours distribution are identical for all pairwise comparisons in the months that followed
the end of the experiment. Columns (4) and (5) are similar to the two previous ones but focus
on earnings instead. The earnings distributions combine monthly hours of work and hourly
wage rates. Not surprisingly it is found that most distributions are diﬀerent both over the
72-month window and in the year that followed the experiment.
3.3 Participation in work and income assistance
Despite its generosity, relatively few treatments receive the SSP supplement at any given
month. Figure 6 plots the monthly proportion of SSP receipt among the various treatments
subgroups. Overall, only approximately 20% of all treatments beneﬁt from the supplement at
any given month. The ﬁgure rises to 35% for those who have established eligibility (qualiﬁed
14and unqualiﬁed treatments), and rises further to 70% for qualiﬁed treatments. On average,
qualiﬁed treatments receive the supplement during 26 months out of a maximum of 36.
Figure 6: Monthly receipt rates of SSP, by group
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Figures 7 and 8 provide prima facie evidence of behavioral response to the SSP incentives.
Figure 7 depicts the monthly IA participation rates. The vast majority of the ineligible treat-
ments leave IA within the ﬁrst few months following random assignment.15 Only about 40%
of the controls do so over the same period. The ﬁgure also shows considerable heterogeneity
among eligible treatments. Once they have established eligibility, the participation rates of
qualiﬁed applicants decrease drastically and remain at the same low level as that of ineligible
treatments for the remainder of the experiment. However, unqualiﬁed treatments leave IA at
a much lower rate and their participation rates always remain above that of the controls.
Figure 8 plots the monthly participation rates on the labor market. The ﬁgure does not
perfectly mirror the previous one since a number of individuals are neither working or on the
rolls in a given month.16 Participation rates of qualiﬁed treatments increase dramatically once
they establish eligibility. Nearly none of unqualiﬁed treatments report working in the eligibility
phase. Their participation rates increase steadily at the same rate as that of the control group’s
members but always remain the lowest. The proportion of qualiﬁed treatments that are active
on the labor market, while decreasing past the qualiﬁcation phase, is higher than that of the
controls well past the end of the experiment. This result is similar to what has been found
by others using slightly diﬀerent samples (e.g.Card and Hyslop (2006)). On the other hand,
15By deﬁnition all the ineligible treatments have left IA during the eligibility phase. The fraction on IA never
reaches 0 because a small fraction moves back and forth between IA and W.
16Adding the curves vertically may sum to less 100%. It indicates that some have left IA for reasons that are
not related to work (e.g. marriage, etc.)
15Figure 7: Monthly IA participation rates


















the participation rates of qualiﬁed and ineligible treatments are very similar in the last few
months of observation.17
Figure 8: Monthly labor market participation rates















17The participation rates in months 69–72 are not statistically diﬀerent at the 5% level of signiﬁcance.
164 Empirical speciﬁcation
The theoretical model and the empirical evidence of the previous sections have highlighted
the fact that the establishment of eligibility may be correlated with expected wage rates. As
argued in section 2, these are potentially determined by unobserved individual eﬀects. Likewise,
the decision to leave IA may also be aﬀected by unobserved individual eﬀects, irrespective of
treatment status, that are correlated to those that determine the wage rates. Omission of these
unobserved eﬀects will likely lead to biased parameter estimates of the treatment eﬀects.
The empirical model we propose integrates these individual eﬀects in an attempt to control
for selection bias into eligibility. The model focuses on the monthly transitions between IA
and work. Both states are assumed mutually exclusive and exhaustive.18 Let
y⋆
it = zitδ + αi + ξit (1)
be a latent variable measuring the (indirect) utility of working relative to IA, where zit is a
vector of exogenous variables, αi is the individual eﬀect, and ξit is a contemporaneous error







The (log)wage equation is speciﬁed as
ωit = xitβ + ηi + ζit, (2)
where xit is a vector of exogenous variables, ηi is the individual (unobserved) eﬀect, and ζit
is a contemporaneous error term. In order to identify the model we must make a number of
assumptions about the stochastic structure. First, we assume that the contemporaneous error
terms and the individual ﬁxed eﬀects are not correlated within and across equations (1) and
(2):
cov(ξit,αi) = cov(ξit,ηi) = cov(ζit,αi) = cov(ζit,ηi) = 0 ∀t.



















18Welfare claimants are entitled to work a limited number of hours each month. As such IA and work are not
entirely exclusive states. We abstract from this possibility and consider the state to be IA in a any given month
if the individual receive IA beneﬁts, irrespective of her working status. As argued by Card and Hyslop (2006),
“A limitation of our modeling approach is the narrow focus on welfare participation, rather than on
a broader set of outcomes, such as welfare and employment status. Over most of the sample period
the time proﬁles of experimental impacts on welfare participation and full-time employment are
mirror images. Thus we believe that our basic ﬁndings can be translated directly into implications
for employment”.


















A priori we expect the correlation σαη to be positive because high-productivity individuals
(large ηi) probably have a greater attachment to the labor market (large αi). Conditional
on ηi and αi, σξζ may capture the correlation between aggregate demand and supply shocks
on wages and employment. It is thus diﬃcult to sign σξζ a priori. All the parameters are
identiﬁed save for the variance of the latent equation (1) which we set to one (σ2
ζ = 1).
The sample at our disposal can be divided into three parts.19 The ﬁrst regime is composed
of all those who work full-time in a given month and whose wage rates are observed. The
probability of this occurring is given by:



















a + ρζit p
1 − ρ2 | ζit,αi,ηi
!
, (5)
where a = zitδ+αi, ρ = σζξ/σζ is the correlation between ζit and ξit, g is the bivariate normal
density, f is the univariate normal density, φ is the standard normal density and Φ is the
normal cumulative distribution. The second regime refers to those who work in a given month
but whose wage rates are not reported:









f(ξit | αi,ηi)dξit = Φ(a | αi,ηi). (6)
Finally, the last regime relates to those who do not work in a given month:









f(ξit | αi,ηi)dξit = Φ(−a | αi,ηi). (7)
19The sample comprises 1,957 individuals. We removed 10 eligible treatment who have worked during qual-
iﬁcation but did not receive SSP beneﬁts. Each individual is observed for 71 months. Thus there are 138,947
contributions to the likelihood function. The three regimes account for 43,304, 3,953 and 91,690 contributions,
respectively.
18By integrating over the whole domain of ξit we implicitly assume that those who do not work















where N = 1957, T = 71, J = 3. Σ includes all identiﬁed parameters in (3) and (4). Finally,
1 I(Rj) is an index function equal to 1 if regime j is chosen, 0 otherwise, and Pit (Rj | αi,ηi)
is one of (5), (6) or (7). The parameter estimates are obtained by the method of simulated
maximum likelihood (see e.g. Train (2003)).20
5 Results
Three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model are estimated. The ﬁrst focuses on the so-called
average treatment eﬀect. The eligibility and qualiﬁcation statuses are not explicitly taken
into consideration. Rather, treatments and controls are only distinguished through a series
of interaction dummy variables that vary across the various phases of the experiment. This
speciﬁcation is based upon equation (1) only. The vector zit includes demographic variables
and the treatment dummy variables. Models 2 and 3 focus on the treatment eﬀect per se. In
both cases, eligibility and qualiﬁcation statuses are explicitly modelled. Both speciﬁcations aim
at measuring the impact of SSP receipt on the transitions into employment. Model 3 jointly
estimates the wage and the participation equations while Model 2 focuses on the participation
equation alone. The latter model thus implicitly imposes the correlation between αi and ηi
to be zero. A comparison of the two models will underline the consequences of neglecting
potential self-selection into eligibility on the measured treatment eﬀect.
All three speciﬁcations include numerous parameter estimates. These are spread over four
tables to ease comparison across models. Table 4 focuses on the impact of the demographic
variables on employment. The parameter estimates of all three models are relatively similar
qualitatively and most have the expected sign. The education variables need be interpreted
relatively to high-school. Not surprisingly, more schooling is strongly associated with higher
transition rates into employment.21 Likewise, more work experience and owning a car or a
house at baseline is also associated with a higher participation rate.22 As expected, households
with more preschoolers and teenagers are less likely to work. Employment is found to be
seasonal, being lowest in the Winter and highest in the Fall. Dummy variables are used to
proxy the yearly ﬂuctuations in the business cycle. The parameter estimates show that the
20The estimations are based upon 500 random Halton draws.
21Surprisingly, Model 3 predicts that those who hold a university degree have lower transitions rates into
employment.
22The latter two variables may potentially be endogenous. We did investigate this issue and found no evidence
of endogeneity biases. Further, removing the two variables from the regression has no impact whatsoever on
the remaining parameter estimates.
19two years during which the experimental sample was recruited (1994 and 1995) are those
during which ﬁnding a job was hardest. After 1996, it appears as tough IA recipients had
an easier time ﬁnding a job despite the fact that unemployment rates was not lower and that
women’s employment rates were stable between 1994 and 2000.23,24 In fact, higher participation
rates may partly be explained by the tightening of IA requirements that were introduced by
the government of British Columbia in 1996. Finally, it is found that employment depicts
considerable state dependence. Being employed in the previous month signiﬁcantly increases
the probability of employment in the current month.
5.1 Estimation of the Treatment Eﬀects
Table 5 focuses on the treatment eﬀects. As mentioned previously, Model 1 estimates the
average treatment eﬀect. Recall from our theoretical discussion that treatments are expected
to delay exit from IA in order to establish eligibility. As shown in the lower panel, all three
treatment eﬀects in the eligibility phase are indeed negative. During the qualiﬁcation phase
(months 13–24), treatments have a lower probability of working in the ﬁrst quarter but a
larger one in the following two quarters. These results are also consistent with our theoretical
discussion. Finally, between months 25 and 60, which more or less corresponds to the entitle-
ment phase, treatments are found to have signiﬁcantly higher participation rates. Once the
experiment has ended (months 61+), both groups appear to behave similarly.
The marginal treatment eﬀects are reported in Table 6. The lower panel shows that the
treatments have a lower participation rate of approximately 1.5 percentage points each quarter
of the eligibility phase. This ﬁgure is very close to those reported by Card and Hyslop (2006)
and Lacroix and Kamionka (2003). During the qualiﬁcation phase, treatments have marginally
lower participation rates in the ﬁrst quarter and marginally higher rates in the next two quar-
ters. Likewise, treatments exhibit larger but decreasing participation rates in the entitlement
phase. The average marginal treatment eﬀect is approximately 5 percentage points.25 The
estimated marginal treatment eﬀects are smaller than what would be expected from inspec-
tion of Figure 8. To understand why this is so, Figure 9 draws the predicted participation
rates of treatments and controls as well as the predicted participation rates of treatments had
they not received SSP beneﬁts. The predicted participation rates closely mimic the observed
participation rates of both groups (not shown). The model, on the other hand, predicts that
qualiﬁed treatments would have had higher participation rates than controls in the absence of
ﬁnancial incentives. It thus appear that treatments very likely self-select into qualiﬁcation and
as a consequence controls do not constitute a proper counterfactual group.
Model 2 explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of the eligibility and qualiﬁcation statuses.
The model does not take into account the selection process based on the wage rates. Recall that
23Unemployment rates in the Vancouver area were 8.6%, 7.9%, 7.9%, 8.2%, 8.0%, 7.7% and 5.8% for 1994 to
2000 respectively. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 282-0091.
24Ford et al. (2003), page 11.
25This estimate is very similar to the one reported by Lacroix and Kamionka (2003) using a duration model.
20Figure 9: Actual and Predicted Participation Rates - Model 1














a treatment must have remained on IA for the ﬁrst 13 months following random assignment to
be considered eligible. Conversely, an ineligible treatment must have left IA for a full-time job




1 for 13 < t ≤ min[T Q,25]
0 otherwise,
where TQ is the month in which the individual establishes qualiﬁcation. Likewise, the ineligi-
bility status is deﬁned as:
Ineligibleit =
￿
1 for T I < t ≤ 71 if yiT I = 1 with 1 ≤ T I ≤ 13
0 otherwise.
Thus a treatment who is observed working at month TI in the ﬁrst 13 months following
randomization becomes ineligible as of TI and remains so for the remainder of the experiment.
Finally, a qualiﬁed treatment is one who has found a job at month TQ ≤ 25 and has left the
rolls.26 SSP entitlement is thus deﬁned as:
SSPit =
￿
1 for T Q < t ≤ (T Q + 35)
0 otherwise
We also deﬁne two additional dummy variables to capture behavioral adjustments once eligibil-
ity and entitlement statuses expire. First, an unqualiﬁed treatment is one who has established
26The dummy variables are set equal to one in the month that follows the establishment of a given status.
Thus, for example, the eligibility status is set to zero from months 1 to 13 and set to one as of month 14 if the
individual remained on the rolls without interruption. Likewise, the variables denoted “Ineligible × Month”
and “SSP” are set to one only in the month that follows the entry into full-time employment.
21eligibility but who did not ﬁnd a job during the qualiﬁcation phase,i.e.
Unqualiﬁedit =
￿
1 for 25 < t ≤ 71 if Eligiblei25 = 1
0 otherwise.
A qualiﬁed treatment may change his behavior once the entitlement period is over. To capture
this we deﬁne the following dummy variable:
PostSSPit =
￿
1 for (T Q + 35) < t ≤ 71
0 otherwise.
The parameter estimates of the second column of Table 5 relate to Model 2. The speciﬁcation
includes a series of interaction variables to allow as much ﬂexibility as possible. The regression
includes dummy variables for the eligibility, unqualiﬁed, ineligibility and entitlement statuses.
Hence the parameter estimates need to be interpreted relative to the control group. Eligible
treatments have lower participation rates in the qualiﬁcation phase and during the following two
years. Indeed, the parameter estimates associated with the variables Eligible, “Unqualiﬁed×25-
36” and “Unqualiﬁed×37–48” are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Those who manage to
qualify and receive SSP beneﬁts have much higher participation rates both during and after the
entitlement phase. The gap between their participation rates and those of the control group
slowly tapers oﬀ once the phase has ended, as shown by the parameter estimate of “Post-
SSP × Trend”. Finally, the ineligible group, those who have left the rolls prior to establishing
eligibility, also have much higher participation rates than the controls. The parameter estimates
are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant but tend to decrease almost linearly in time.
The parameter estimates of the third column of Table 5 relate to Model 3. Qualitatively,
the parameters of Models 2 and 3 are relatively similar. On the other hand, the parameters
associated with the unqualiﬁed variables in Model 3 are larger in absolute value while those
associated with the SSP and Ineligible variables are smaller. The top panel of Table 6 reports
the estimated marginal treatment eﬀects of both models. As shown, Model 2 slightly over-
estimates the exit rates of eligible and unqualiﬁed treatments. It also overestimates the exit
rates of qualiﬁed and ineligible treatments by a few percentage points. Figure 10 reports the
predicted participation rates of Models 2 and 3 side by side. Both models mimic the observed
participation rates relatively well (not shown). The ﬁgure shows that the predictions of Model
2 always lay above those of Model 3. Because the counterfactual rates of both models are
almost identical, the marginal eﬀects of Model 2 are always greater than those of Model 3.
The diﬀerence between the two models is entirely driven by the correlation between the
wage equation and the participation equation. The parameters of the wage equation are
reported in Table 7. Most parameter estimates have the expected sign and magnitude. Hence,
more schooling and experience is conducive to a higher wage rate.27 Interestingly, unqualiﬁed
27Experience is time dependent. It is computed as follows:




22Figure 10: Predicted Participation Rates - Models 2 & 3
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treatments command the lowest monthly wage rate which is between 7.3% and 14.4% lower
than the wage received by the control group. Qualiﬁed treatments also receive a lower wage.
During the entitlement phase, their wage rate is roughly 2.7% lower. This is consistent with
the theoretical results that showed that SSP beneﬁts could result in lower reservation wages.
Furthermore, in the post-SSP phase the wage rates of the controls and the qualiﬁed treatments
are essentially identical. Again, this is consistent with the theoretical model. The parameter
estimates also indicate that there is very little diﬀerence between the wages ineligible treatments
and controls receive. The diﬀerences depicted in Figures 2 and 3 are thus probably entirely
due to diﬀerences in the observable and unobservables characteristics of each group.
Finally, Table 8 reports the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix and the
covariance matrix per se. The parameter estimate of σαη is large and positive. We must thus
conclude that high-productivity individuals also appear to have greater attachment to the
labor market.
All in all, our empirical ﬁndings concur with the theoretical model presented in Section 2.
The built-in incentives of the SSP program induce recipients to self-select into eligibility and
qualiﬁcation. Consequently, those who end-up receiving SSP beneﬁts are not representative
of the population of welfare recipients. They have lower expected wage rates and less human
capital than recipients who exit IA prior to establishing eligibility. On the other hand, those
who establish eligibility but never qualify have the lowest level of human capital and probably
have weaker preferences for work according to the parameter estimates. By neglecting the
selectivity into the program, Model 2 produces biased estimates the participation equation.
The parameter estimates of both the demographic variables and the treatment eﬀects diﬀer
substantially from those of Model 3. Thus the treatment eﬀect measured under Model 2 is
where Experiencei0 is the number of months of experience at baseline.
23slightly overestimated because it omits the fact that qualiﬁed treatments with higher wage
rates are also more attached to the labor market. Once we account for individual ﬁxed eﬀects,
this bias washes away.
6 Conclusion
The Applicant Study of the Self-Suﬃciency Project aimed at measuring the responsiveness
of welfare applicants to a generous and time-limited income supplement. Randomly selected
applicants had to meet two conditions to receive the supplement. The ﬁrst, the eligibility
condition, required that they remained on welfare for at least twelve months. The second,
the qualiﬁcation condition, required that they ﬁnd a full-time job within twelve months after
establishing eligibility and left the rolls.
The SSP demonstration has received widespread attention partly because of the generosity
of the supplement it oﬀered and partly because of the large behavioral responses it generated.
Most papers that assess the impact of the SSP nevertheless neglect one important feature of
the program, namely that the ﬁnancial reward for becoming qualiﬁed is inversely proportional
to the expected wage rate. In this paper we acknowledge the fact that the “treatment” is
not homogeneous but is a continuum that depends on potential wage rates. Using a search-
theoretical framework, and under very simple assumptions about the wage distribution, we
show that those who have a low expected wage rate have a clear incentive to establish eligibil-
ity. Consequently, those who eventually receive the SSP supplement may constitute a highly
selected group among the treatment group.
Empirical non-parametric evidence strongly suggests that treatments self-select into eli-
gibility. We thus specify an econometric model that simultaneously estimate the choice of
working full time and the level of individual wage rates. The two equations are correlated
through individual eﬀects and through contemporaneous shocks. We ﬁnd mild evidence that
treatments self-select into eligibility and qualiﬁcation. Once we properly account for the selec-
tion issue, the treatment eﬀects decrease slightly but remain important.
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26Table 4: Participation equation: Demographic variables
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Para. S.d. Para. S.d. Para. S.d.
Intercept -1.748 (0.166)⋆ -2.067 (0.170)⋆ -2.274 (0.095)⋆
Less than high school -0.292 (0.039)⋆ -0.234 (0.042)⋆ -0.181 (0.035)⋆
Post-secondary -0.016 (0.027) -0.008 (0.030) -0.038 (0.025)
University 0.064 (0.047) 0.053 (0.049) -0.112 (0.035)⋆
Experience 4.926 (0.328)⋆ 4.432 (0.346)⋆ 4.708 (0.189)⋆
Age -3.281 (0.345)⋆ -2.839 (0.360)⋆ -2.010 (0.216)⋆
Car 0.125 (0.012)⋆ 0.098 (0.013)⋆ 0.075 (0.012)⋆
Home 0.042 (0.010)⋆ 0.050 (0.010)⋆ 0.063 (0.009)⋆
Children less that 7 years -0.216 (0.012)⋆ -0.202 (0.013)⋆ -0.214 (0.011)⋆
Children 7-18 years -0.085 (0.010)⋆ -0.086 (0.011)⋆ -0.094 (0.009)⋆
Married 0.152 (0.019)⋆ 0.134 (0.019)⋆ 0.140 (0.018)⋆
Born in Canada (yes = 1) 0.102 (0.048)⋆ 0.096 (0.051)⋆⋆ -0.066 (0.026)⋆
Gender (woman = 1) -0.010 (0.082) -0.003 (0.080) 0.044 (0.037)
Spring 0.082 (0.020)⋆ 0.089 (0.020)⋆ 0.084 (0.020)⋆
Summer 0.112 (0.018)⋆ 0.123 (0.018)⋆ 0.118 (0.018)⋆
Fall 0.162 (0.021)⋆ 0.187 (0.021)⋆ 0.180 (0.021)⋆
1994 -0.782 (0.027)⋆ -0.925 (0.026)⋆ -0.924 (0.025)⋆
1995 -0.451 (0.021)⋆ -0.619 (0.020)⋆ -0.618 (0.019)⋆
1997 0.234 (0.021)⋆ 0.288 (0.018)⋆ 0.271 (0.018)⋆
1998 0.432 (0.022)⋆ 0.441 (0.020)⋆ 0.414 (0.020)⋆
1999 0.519 (0.023)⋆ 0.544 (0.022)⋆ 0.504 (0.021)⋆
2000–2001 0.653 (0.031)⋆ 0.694 (0.030)⋆ 0.645 (0.027)⋆
Lag (work) 3.105 (0.013)⋆ 3.059 (0.013)⋆ 3.058 (0.013)⋆
⋆ Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level.
27Table 5: Participation equation: Treatment eﬀects
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Para. S.d. Para. S.d. Para. S.d.
Group variables
Eligible — -0.938 (0.067)⋆ -1.107 (0.062)⋆
Unqualiﬁed×Months 25-36 — -0.283 (0.074)⋆ -0.432 (0.063)⋆
Unqualiﬁed×Months 37-48 — -0.182 (0.066)⋆ -0.320 (0.052)⋆
Unqualiﬁed×Months 49-60 — 0.026 (0.070) -0.106 (0.066)
Unqualiﬁed×Months 61-72 — 0.058 (0.068) -0.089 (0.057)
SSP — 1.186 (0.042)⋆ 0.976 (0.028)⋆
PostSSP — 1.067 (0.060)⋆ 0.860 (0.053)⋆
PostSSP× Trend — -0.027 (0.004)⋆ -0.026 (0.004)⋆
Ineligible×Month 2-12 — 1.162 (0.045)⋆ 1.073 (0.036)⋆
Ineligible×Month 13-24 — 0.798 (0.044)⋆ 0.705 (0.034)⋆
Ineligible×Month 25-36 — 0.619 (0.043)⋆ 0.514 (0.034)⋆
Ineligible×Month 37-48 — 0.472 (0.048)⋆ 0.381 (0.039)⋆
Ineligible×Month 49-60 — 0.353 (0.046)⋆ 0.278 (0.036)⋆
Ineligible×Month 61-72 — 0.305 (0.048)⋆ 0.230 (0.039)⋆
Monthly dummies
Eligibility phase
Months 2-4 -0.259 (0.063)⋆ — —
Months 5-8 -0.221 (0.056)⋆ — —
Months 9-12 -0.157 (0.053)⋆ — —
Qualiﬁcation phase
Months 13-16 -0.129 (0.054)⋆ — —
Months 17-20 0.181 (0.052)⋆ — —
Months 21-24 0.263 (0.053)⋆ — —
SSP phase
Months 25-28 0.403 (0.054)⋆ — —
Months 29-32 0.485 (0.056)⋆ — —
Months 33-36 0.413 (0.057)⋆ — —
Months 37-40 0.257 (0.058)⋆ — —
Months 41-44 0.357 (0.057)⋆ — —
Months 45-48 0.175 (0.057)⋆ — —
Months 49-52 0.088 (0.057) — —
Months 53-56 0.180 (0.060)⋆ — —
Months 57-60 0.101 (0.061)⋆⋆ — —
Post-SSP phase
Months 61-64 0.061 (0.059) — —
Months 65-68 0.026 (0.060) — —
Months 69-72 -0.027 (0.059) — —
⋆ Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level.
28Table 6: Participation equation: marginal treatment eﬀects
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Group variables
Eligible — -0.010 -0.028
Unqualiﬁed×Months 25-36 — -0.012 -0.027
Unqualiﬁed×Months 37-48 — -0.013 -0.029
Unqualiﬁed×Months 49-60 — 0.003 -0.012
Unqualiﬁed×Months 61-72 — 0.006 -0.011
SSP — 0.139 0.110
PostSSP — 0.088 0.067
Ineligible×Month 2-12 — 0.103 0.089
Ineligible×Month 13-24 — 0.110 0.094
Ineligible×Month 25-36 — 0.088 0.074
Ineligible×Month 37-48 — 0.068 0.056
Ineligible×Month 49-60 — 0.050 0.040
Ineligible×Month 61-72 — 0.043 0.034
Monthly dummies
Eligibility phase
Months 2-4 -0.016 — —
Months 5-8 -0.017 — —
Months 9-12 -0.014 — —
Qualiﬁcation phase
Months 13-16 -0.013 — —
Months 17-20 0.021 — —
Months 21-24 0.033 — —
SSP phase
Months 25-28 0.054 — —
Months 29-32 0.067 — —
Months 33-36 0.057 — —
Months 37-40 0.036 — —
Months 41-44 0.048 — —
Months 45-48 0.024 — —
Months 49-52 0.012 — —
Months 53-56 0.025 — —
Months 57-60 0.014 — —
Post-SSP phase
Months 61-64 0.008 — —
Months 65-68 0.004 — —
Months 69-72 -0.004 — —
Marginal eﬀects are computed as means over corresponding phase.
29Table 7: Wage equation
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Para. S.d. Para. S.d. Para. S.d.
Intercept — — 1.577 (0.003)⋆
Less than high school — — 0.017 (0.005)⋆
Post-secondary — — 0.044 (0.003)⋆
University — — 0.096 (0.004)⋆
Experience — — 3.304 (0.018)⋆
Experience2 — — -0.642 (0.034)⋆
Exper.×LHS — — 0.047 (0.024)⋆
Exper.×PostSec — — -0.159 (0.014)⋆
Exper.×Univ — — -0.192 (0.018)⋆
Unqualiﬁed×Months 25-36 — — -0.093 (0.009)⋆
Unqualiﬁed×Months 37-48 — — -0.073 (0.007)⋆
Unqualiﬁed×Months 49-60 — — -0.113 (0.007)⋆
Unqualiﬁed×Months 61-72 — — -0.144 (0.006)⋆
SSP — — -0.027 (0.003)⋆
PostSSP — — 0.007 (0.003)⋆
PostSSP (trend) — — 0.001 (0.000)⋆
Ineligible×Month 2-12 — — 0.001 (0.002)
Ineligible×Month 13-24 — — -0.013 (0.002)⋆
Ineligible×Month 25-36 — — 0.003 (0.002)
Ineligible×Month 37-48 — — 0.013 (0.002)⋆
Ineligible×Month 49-60 — — 0.024 (0.002)⋆
Ineligible×Month 61-72 — — 0.008 (0.002)⋆
⋆ Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level.
Table 8: Covariance matrix
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3











σα 0.699 (0.013)⋆ 0.746 (0.015)⋆ 0.352
ση 0.226
σαη 0.737
⋆ Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level.
Note that C =
„
C00 0
C01 1
«
, K =
„
K00 0
K01 K11
«
so that
CC′ =
„
σξ σξζ
σξζ 1
«
and KK′ =
„
ση σηα
σηα σα
«
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